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Abstract: This paper presents some material for a history 
of the reception of ancient Greek sophistic in the Renais-
sance. First, it discusses what knowledge the dialectician 
and rhetorician Rudolph Agricola (1483-1485) may have 
had about the ancient Greek sophists by analysing two 
passages where Agricola explicitly mentions the ancient 
sophists. Second, it explores the meaning and use of the 
word ‘sophista’ in the context of the humanist-scholastic 
debate of the early 16th century and in the first compre-
hensive history of the Greek sophists in antiquity, Louis 
de Cressolles’ Theatrum veterum rhetorum, oratorum, 
declamatorum quos in Graecia nominabant sophistas 
(1620). It will be observed that Agricola’s views on the 
early Greek sophists, in so far as they can be recon-
structed, stand in strong contrast with those of Cressolles. 
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Since the landmark essays of Hannay Gray and Paul 
Oskar Kristeller it is well known that the study and recep-
tion of the ancient Greek and Roman rhetorical theory and 
practice by the humanists constituted a major contribution 
to the intellectual culture of the Renaissance.2  Neverthe-
less, this is still an area of studies where much is left to be 
explored. In this essay I will look into the question what 
knowledge the Frisian scholar of dialectic and rhetoric 
Rudolph Agricola, whose work has attracted much atten-
tion in recent decades, may have had about the early 
Greek sophists and their place in the ancient history of 
dialectic and rhetoric.3 This discussion will lead us to ex-
plore the wider context in which the word ‘sophista’ was 
used in Agricola’s time and later in the Renaissance. In 
this connection, we will look at Louis de Cressolles’ view 
on the ancient sophists in his Theatrum veterum rhetorum, 




2. Ancient Greek sophists 
 
‘Sophist’ was a term used in antiquity for a number of 
wandering scholars in the ancient Greek city states during 
the second half of the fifth and the first part of the fourth 
century BCE. These scholars, among whom Protagoras of 
Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Cos, and Hip-
pias of Elis were prominent, taught eloquence and the art 
of debating, but also linguistics, esthetic, moral philoso-
phy and other branches of knowledge. Although the soph-
ists never formed a coherent group or movement, their 
biographer Flavius Philostratus (c. 165-c.250 CE) labelled 
their art with the generic term ἡ ἀρχαία σοφιστική (‘an-
cient sophistic’), which he says must be considered as 
ῥητορική φιλοσοφοῦσα (‘philosophical rhetoric’) be-
cause, as Philostratus explains, the sophists discoursed 
about general and philosophical subjects such as courage, 
justice, the heroes and the gods, and the universe. This 
distinguishes them, according to Philostratus, from the 
sophists of his own time, because these sophists dealt 
only with specific subjects such as the types of the poor 
man and the rich, princes and tyrants, and historical sub-
jects; in other words, they did not discuss philosophical 
subject matter.4 The original meaning of the word ‘soph-
ist’ (σοφιστής) is ‘sage’,5 but it obtained a pejorative 
force as a result of  Plato’s and Aristotle’s criticism of the 
logical tricks and the relativism of some sophists, Pro-
tagoras and Gorgias in particular.  
 
 
3. Agricola and the ancient Greek sophists 
 
Rudolph Agricola (1443-1485), born in Frisia, was 
trained in the late-medieval arts curriculum at the univer-
sities of Erfurt and Louvain, where he graduated as 
magister artium in 1465. He became thoroughly ac-
quainted with Italian humanism during a lengthy stay in 
Northern Italy between 1469 (perhaps earlier) and 1479. 
For several years he was active at the university of Pavia 
and contributed to the humanist movement there. In 1475, 
he went to Ferrara, where he learnt Greek and translated 
several Greek texts into Latin, among which (ps.-
)Isocrates’ Paraenesis ad Demonicum (1478), about 
which more below. In Ferrara he also started working on 
De inventione dialectica, which he finished shortly after 
he left Italy in the early months of 1479. In this treatise 
Agricola blends dialectic with rhetoric, which had previ-
ously been separate disciplines. Not long before his un-
timely death in 1485, he wrote a brief pedagogical treatise 
in the form of a letter, that was often printed in the six-
teenth century with the title De formando studio. None of 
Agricola’s writings were published during his lifetime, 
but several of them, in particular De formando studio and 
De inventione dialectica, went through numerous print-
ings during the sixteenth century. 
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Agricola’s writings contain two explicit references to the 
ancient sophists, one in the letter in which he dedicates 
his translation of the Isocratean Πρὸς Δηµόνικον 
(Paraenesis ad Demonicum) to his elder (half-)brother 
Johannes, the other in De formando studio. First, the letter 
dedicating his translation of Πρὸς Δηµόνικον to his bro-
ther. This text, erroneously attributed to Isocrates in Agri-
cola’s time, is a brief pedagogical treatise, which was 
very well received among Italian humanist pedagogues. 
Agricola recommends it with great enthusiasm to Johan-
nes: 
 
(4) Quum sint autem permulta, que ad uite pertineant insti-
tucionem Grecis Latinisque litteris conscripta, egregia inprimis 
et admirabilis Isocratis ad Demonicum paraenesis mihi uidetur. 
(5) Ea enim suauitas est dicendi, is ornatus et (ut ita dicam) 
sculptura orationis, tanta preterea maiestas utilitas decor precep-
torum, ut, si, quemadmodum pugiles meditatos quosdam nodos 
nexusque habent, quibus inter certamina subito et uel non cogi-
tantes etiam utantur, ita nos quoque oporteat certa quedam et ad 
manum posita uitae habere precepta, que omnes nostras uelut ad 
filum dirigant acciones, quorumque tenax infixa mentibus nos-
tris memoria recti nos limitem egredi unique uetet, hic libellus 
aptus uel maxime ad hanc rem atque accomodatus mihi uideatur. 
(6) Eum itaque tibi in Latinum sermonem e Greco conuerti, me 
rem scrupulosam conatus, ut numeros quoque, quorum ille fuit 
obseruantissimus, et scemata uel (ut nos dicimus) exornationes 
orationis, quoad possem, imitarer. Per similiter enim cadencia et 
desinentia et equata et contraposita et reliquos id genus ornatus 
uoluitur oratio. Quorum ut studiosus precipue Gorgias Leontinus 
preceptor eius aliique etatis illius sophiste fuerunt, ita diligencior 
iste, ut secuta eum, non affectata uiderentur. Hunc ego legen-
dum tibi etiam atque etiam, sed ad uerbum quoque ediscendum 
censeo semperque uelut ante oculos tamquam regulam quandam 
uitę prescriptum habendum. (Letter 15, ed. Van der Laan and 
Akkerman, 102-104) 
 
A great many things dealing with how to arrange one’s life have 
been written in Greek and Latin literature. It seems to me, how-
ever, that Isocrates’ Exhortation to Demonicus is particularly 
outstanding and commendable. Its wording is sweet, its style 
beautifully carved, as it were; moreover, its teachings are par-
ticularly impressive, useful and appropriate. So if we are to learn 
certain things that come in handy at all times, that guide and di-
rect all our actions, and that we firmly implant in our minds so 
as to remind us of the path of righteousness that we ought never 
to stray from (just as boxers have certain holds and grips that 
they practice and then automatically use during a match), then 
this booklet seems to me to be perhaps the most comprehensive 
and appropriate for the job. I have therefore translated it from 
Greek into Latin. I have even tried to do something which re-
quires particular skill, that is, to also include Isocrates’ rhythms 
(to which he paid great attention) as far as I could, and also his 
figures of speech or (as we call them) stylistic embellishments. 
For his text picks up words in like cases, words with like end-
ings, parallel clauses, opposite clauses, all that kind of embel-
lishment. Gorgias of Leontini, his [i.e. Isocrates’] teacher, and 
other Sophists of the time eagerly used these stylistic figures, 
and Isocrates made particular use of them himself, making sure 
that they were naturally incorporated into his text instead of 
forced upon it. I think that you should read this booklet over and 
over again, but also learn it by heart, word for word, holding it 
in front of you as though it were a rule and guideline for life.  
(Van der Laan and Akkerman, 103-105) 
 
Agricola’s remarks on the style of Isocrates and the soph-
ists reflect his reading of several ancient testimonies. The 
suavitas of Isocrates’ style comes from Cicero, De ora-
tore 3.28 (“Suavitatem Isocrates [...] habuit”). Isocrates’ 
use of rhythm (‘numerus’) is attested in De oratore 3.173 
and Brutus 32-33, and one of these passages, or both, is 
probably Agricola’s source.6 Agricola does not follow 
Cicero’s observation in these two passages that Isocrates 
was the first to apply rhythm. This may be due to the fact 
that Agricola was aware that Cicero had corrected himself 
in Orator 174-175, where he says that it was claimed by 
Isocrates’ admirers that he was the first to introduce 
rhythm into prose, but that Thrasymachus was the inven-
tor of it.7 Agricola may also have in mind Orator 165, 
where Cicero mentions that Gorgias was the first to apply 
the skilful connection of words and clauses by means of 
symmetry and antithesis, though he does not use the tech-
nical term concinnitas that Cicero uses in this passage (“It 
is said that Gorgias was the first to strive for this sort of 
symmetry”; “In huius concinnitatis consectatione Gor-
giam fuisse principem accepimus”; Trans. Hubbell 1939, 
443-445). Agricola’s obervation that Isocrates’ use of the 
Gorgianic figures of style was moderate, reflects the gen-
eral praise for Isocrates’ style in the classical testimonies, 
and perhaps in particular Cicero’s observation in Orator 
176 that Gorgias made excessive use of rhythm (“But 
Gorgias is too fond of this style, and uses these “embroid-
eries” (his own word for it) too boldly”; “Gorgias autem 
avidior est generis eius et his festivitatibus – sic enim ipse 
censet – insolentius abutitur”; Trans. Hubbell 1939, 455). 
The second text in which Agricola mentions the an-
cient sophists is his letter to Jacob Barbireau, written in 
Heidelberg on June 7, 1484. The letter is a response to 
Barbireau’s request for advice about the approach he 
should take to his studies. Agricola begins by discussing 
the different subjects one will choose depending on one’s 
talent and financial means. If one has both, and if one as-
pires to follow a study which is honorable in its own 
right, then one must choose to study philosophy, which 
Agricola divides into ethics, including the study of the 
bible, and natural sciences. He then discusses the methods 
one needs to follow in order to achieve good results. This 
includes recording and memorizing systematically every-
thing one has read in order to acquire knowledge and 
have it ready at hand, so to speak. This skill is acquired 
by using a mnemonic system of juxtaposed headings such 
as virtue/vice, life/death, learning/ignorance, friendli-
ness/hatred. Second, one must acquire the ability to make 
the knowledge one has acquired productive, by expertly 
composing new, original texts. This, Agricola says, can 
be achieved by means of the topics of invention, for 
which he refers Barbireau to De inventione dialectica. 
The essence of the method of learning Agricola mentions 
here is discussed in book 2, chapters 28 and 29 of De in-
ventione dialectica and consists of two steps. First, the 
topics are used to collect data (facts, sayings, anything 
one knows or has found in one’s readings) about individ-
ual things (Agricola uses the Latin word ‘res’, which in-
cludes both abstract concepts and concrete things situated 
in place and time); these data subsequently form the ma-
terial for arguments both for and against any proposition 
in which the ‘res’ in question is taken up, either in a 
philosophical debate or in an oratorical discourse intended 
to instruct or persuade an audience. 
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In the course of the passage describing the method of 
study to be followed, Agricola mentions the early Greek 
sophists: 
 
(54) Quisquis ergo prius id recte et cum cura tractauerit, preser-
tim si rationem dialectice inuentionis illi adiunxerit, ingens illi 
paratissimaque de omni fere proposita re disserendi facultas 
continget, modo ea ulla ex parte as eas pertineat, quas didicit, 
artes. Hoc quoque pacto veteres illos professores artium, quos 
Greci sophistas, id est doctores, uocabant, exercuisse se depre-
hendo, quantum ex Aristotele et Platone coniicere licet, atque ad 
eam eruditionem promtitudinemque dicendi peruenerunt, ut, de 
qua re audire quis uellet, proponi iuberent dicerentque, quamdiu 
quantumque uideretur de eo, quod esset propositum. Sic Gorgias 
Leontinus, primus tam audacis cepti auctor, sic Prodicus Chius, 
sic Protagoras Abderites atque Hippias Eleus et instituti sunt et 
alios docuere. (Letter 15, ed. Van der Laan and Akkerman, 216) 
 
So whoever has practised that first point of mine [i.e. the mne-
monic system of headings; the second being the analysis of texts 
in order to range the material they contain under the appropriate 
headings] correctly and with care, especially if he has combined 
it with the dialectical invention method, that person will attain 
an enormous and most readily available capacity to treat almost 
any matter that is suggested, provided it is related in some re-
spect to the arts he has learned. I have found that this is also the 
way in which those ancient teachers of the arts whom the Greeks 
called sophists, which means instructors, practiced their skills, 
as far as I can figure out from Aristotle and Plato. And they 
reached such a degree of learning and such ease in speaking that 
they would ask anyone to suggest any matter they wanted to 
know something about, then would speak on what had been 
suggested as long and as much as they saw fit. In this way Gor-
gias of Leontini (he was the first to engage in such a bold prac-
tice) and Prodicus of Cos, Protagoras of Abdera and Hippias of 
Elis were trained and taught others. (Van der Laan and Akker-
man, 217) 
 
In this passage, Agricola states that his method of study, 
the art of memory combined with topical invention, was 
also applied by the early Greek sophists. He only gives a 
vague reference to Plato and Aristotle to support this 
claim, but he does mention the feat of speaking extempo-
raneously for which Gorgias was famous in antiquity. 
Agricola probably has in mind here Cicero, De finibus 
2.1, where Cicero labels Gorgias’ habit of speaking ex-
temporaneously as an audax negotium.8 In addition, Agri-
cola’s observations probably reflect Cicero, De oratore 
3.126-129, a passage about the rhetoric of the sophists 
and especially their skill in speaking about any subject, 
where not only Gorgias, but also Hippias of Elis, Prodicus 
of Cos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon and Protagoras of 
Abdera are mentioned. Agricola’s reference to Plato and 
Aristotle may suggest that he systematically collected in-
formation about the sophists and their work, but in fact he 
only mentions a well-known practice of the sophists about 
which many ancient testimonies exist.9 
Peter Mack has mentioned that Juan Luis Vives, in De 
instrumento probabilitatis (1531), cites Agricola’s belief 
that the ancient sophists had drawn their copia and facility 
from the topics.10 Vives says this in a passage in which he 
discusses the description of ‘man’ by means of various 
topics, such as substance, conjugates, actions, causes, 
things that relate to man, such as God, parents, teachers, 
and so forth. Vives continues by listing things which may 
be adduced as arguments:   
pro argumentis adducantur majores, exempla priorum, historiae, 
fabulae, proverbia, si quid praedictum de illo, aut praemonstra-
tum, quid dixit, aut significavit quis, nomen, cognomen, appella-
tio: ex his apparet non solum ad arguendum valere hanc copiam, 
sed ad dicendum de quacunque re velis, ut non absurde videatur 
Agricola Rodolphus existimare Gorgiam, Hippiam, Prodicum, et 
alios Graecos sophistas, qui in conventu hominum paratos se 
esse profitebantur ad dicendum de quacunque re quis vellet 
audire, ex his fontibus ubertatem illam et redundantiam eorum, 
quae dicturi essent, haurire, ut nunquam dicendi materia deficer-
entur (Opera omnia, vol. 3, 116-117).  
 
As arguments one may use ancestors, examples of previous gen-
erations, historical narratives, fictional stories, proverbs, any-
thing said or predicted about the individual who is subject of the 
discourse, what someone has said or indicated, name, surname, 
title. From these things it is clear that this supply not only serves 
towards arguing but also towards speaking about any subject 
you might wish. Hence it does not seem contrary to reason that 
Rudoph Agricola thinks that Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus and the 
other Greek sophists, who claimed that they were skilled at 
speaking in an assembly about any subject anyone might ask 
for, derived their famous abundance, and even excess, of things 
to say from these sources, so that they would never be short of 
material to speak about. (my trans.) 
 
Because Vives makes a clear distinction between arguing 
and speaking about any subject, it is possible that he 
thinks that Agricola had in minds particularly discussions 
of illustrious subjects11 or commonplaces, which Pro-
tagoras and Gorgias were the first to treat, according to 
Quintilian (Inst. 3.1.12) and Cicero (Brut. 46). Agricola, 
however, does not cite of refer to these testimonies. And 
even if Agricola believed more generally that the sophists 
used topics as their sources, it is unclear from this passage 
on the basis of which texts or testimonies he had con-
cluded this. In fact, it seems rather unlikely that Agricola 
supposed that the ancient sophists already had a fully de-
veloped system of topics such we know it from later 
handbooks of rhetoric. This may be inferred from De in-
ventione dialectica 2.25, an important chapter in which 
Agricola argues that the method of topical invention, 
which is common to all arts and sciences, belongs to dia-
lectic, and that there are no topics of invention proper to 
rhetoric. This raises the question why so many teachers of 
eloquence wrote about inventio. Here is Agricola’s an-
swer to this question: 
 
Cum veniant autem tales plerunque quaestiones in forum, de 
quibus nihil perpetuum praecipi possit, sed contentione 
dicendique vi trahantur in quamvis partem, fuit idcirco tradenda 
communis quaedam inveniendi ratio, conveniens omnibus 
quaestionibus. Quae quidem rectissime peteretur a dialectico, si 
tradita iam tum fuisset. Sed multo post secutus est Aristoteles, 
qui primus eam in artis formam cogere adorsus est. (De inven-
tione dialectica 2.25, ed. Mundt, 382) 
 
However, since usually questions come up on the forum about 
which one cannot give any general precepts, but which are 
twisted and turned in any direction in the course of the dispute 
and by the force of speaking, it was necessary for that reason to 
formulate some general method of invention, suitable for all 
questions. If this method had been formulated already at that 
time, it would have been demanded most properly from the dia-
lectician. But Aristotle, who was the first to have undertaken to 
compress it [i.e. a method of invention] into the form of an art, 
came much later. (my trans.) 
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Agricola says here that in the time before Aristotle, rhet-
oricians developed a method of invention suitable for all 
questions that were disputed for and against on the forum. 
It seems likely that, if Agricola believed that this method 
was based on the topics, and if he thought that this 
method had been developed by the sophists, he would 
have said so explicitly in this passage. He highlights the 
practice of reasoning for and against on the forum be-
cause this is the essence of dialectical reasoning, of which 
he maintains that it is applied not only in philosophy, but 
in oratory and in all branches of knowledge. However, 
there is no indication, here or elsewhere, that Agricola 
thought reasoning for and against had been invented by 
the sophists, for instance on the basis of the testimonies 
that Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two 
sides to any issue (Diogenes Laertius IX, 50; cf. Seneca 
Ep. 88, 43). Vives’ remark in De instrumento probabilita-
tis thus seems to be an overstatement. 
The passages discussed above offer no evidence to 
conclude that Agricola has made a thorough study of the 
contribution of the sophists to the early Greek art of rea-
soning. What he says about the early sophists amounts to 
not more than traditional knowledge handed down in an-
tiquity from generation to generation and recorded in a 




4. ‘Sophista’ in the Renaissance, the humanist-
scholastic debate of the early sixteenth century and 
Cressolles’ Theatrum veterum rhetorum, oratorum, 
declamatorum, quos in Graecia nominabant σοφιστάς 
(1620) 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that Agricola’s judgement 
about the sophists is entirely positive. He highlights that 
they were teachers and good witers, makes no mention of 
Cicero’s remark that Gorgias was excessive in his use of 
rhythm (Or. 175-176), and, although he says that he read 
about the sophists in Plato and Aristotle, he never raises 
their critical stance on the sophists, for instance Aris-
totle’s criticism that the sophist is one who makes money 
from apparent and not real wisdom, and therefore aims at 
apparent, not real proof (SE 165 a 22), Plato’s critical dis-
cussion of Protagoras’ homo-mensura thesis in Theaetetus 
(151 e – 171 a 4), or of the sophists’ logical fallacies in 
Euthydemus. This is remarkable, because contemporary 
readers of Plato, for instance Marsilio Ficino, did bring up 
explicitly Plato’s negative attitude towards the sophists.12 
Likewise notable is the fact that Agricola never uses the 
word sophist (‘sophista’), commonly used in his time to 
denote a student in the Faculty of Arts,13 as a nickname 
for scholastic dialecticians. This practice seems to have 
been common among humanist critics of  scholastic dia-
lectic, both before and after Agricola. For instance, 
Lorenzo Valla, referring to the use of unclassical words in 
contemporary dialectic, speaks of the traps and tricks of 
the sophists (“laquei et captiones sophistarum”),14 and in 
the early days of the Reformation, ‘sophista’ was fre-
quently used by humanists to discredit scholastic dialecti-
cians and theologians, and by university theologians to 
discredit humanists as loquacious orators who wrongly 
connect rhetoric with theology,15 or worse, as dishonest or 
even heretical theologians. Erasmus was a famous victim 
of this practice of framing in his polemic with university 
theologians about his Declamation on the praise of mar-
riage.16 A similar fate struck Cornelius Agrippa of 
Nettesheim, when theologians from the universities of 
Paris and Louvain condemned his Declamation De incer-
titudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium as heretical, and 
expurgated certain passages from it.17 The condemnation 
did not put Agrippa’s work out of circulation, but from 
the middle of the sixteenth century onward his work was 
systematically presented as a literary paradox written 
without serious purpose, and Agrippa was stigmatized as 
a deceitful and insincere scholar.18 
The clash between humanist and scholastic theolo-
gians in the early days of the Reformation and the stigma 
that was subsequently fixed on humanist theologians such 
as Erasmus and Agrippa suggests that the notions of soph-
istry and sophist were applied specifically to scholars and 
theologians who were critical of the Roman Church. The 
first comprehensive history of Greek sophistic, the 
Theatrum veterum rhetorum, oratorum, declamatorum, 
quos in Graecia nominabant σοφιστάς (Paris, 1620) by 
the French Jesuit Louis de Cressolles, published some 
fifty years after the Council of Trent had reinforced the 
established doctrine of the Roman Church, confirms that 
even the art of the early Greek sophists was seen entirely 
from this contemporary perspective. 
Most Renaissance scholars will know Cressolles’ 
work from Marc Fumaroli’s L’âge de l’éloquence from 
1980, in which Fumaroli studies the rhetoric and the cul-
ture of eloquence in France from the second half of the 
sixteenth century (beginning after the Council of Trent) 
until the beginning of the period of classicism, which 
started around the middle of the seventeenth century. In 
this period of the late Renaissance, epideictic rhetoric 
flourished intensely. During the first decades of the 
seventeenth century, the Jesuits in particular played a key 
role in what Fumaroli has called ‘the sacred sophistic’ 
(“la sophistique sacrée”). Cressolles wrote two important 
works, the Theatrum, and the Vacationes autumnales, a 
work in which he discusses actio, the fifth task of the ora-
tor, and how courtesy is a reflection of a good character. 
In his examination of the Theatrum, Fumaroli focuses on 
Cressolles’ discussion of the so-called second sophistic in 
books 3 and 4,19 and especially on what he sees as Cres-
solles’ fascination with – I quote literally – ‘these hea-
thens whom he wants to naturalize as christians’ (“ces 
paiëns qu’il veut naturaliser chrétiens”).20 The focus on 
this aspect of Cressolles’ work is entirely appropriate in 
the context of Fumaroli’s book, but it is equally illuminat-
ing to see what Cressolles has to say about the early 
Greek sophistic. Cressolles offers the first ever systematic 
and critical discussion and interpretation of all the surviv-
ing sources about the notion ‘σοφιστής’ and its uses in 
pre-classical Greece, and of the ancient and the second 
sophistic following Philostratus’ conception of the terms 
(Vitae sophistarum, Book 1, p. 480-481 Olearius), starting 
from the note in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Minos (319 
c 3-7) on verses 178-179 in book 19 of the Odyssee, 
where Zeus is called a sophist, and ending with the era of 
the sophists after the reign of Constantine the Great, 
whose biographies were written by Eunapius. This im-
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pressive work of Jesuit scholarship offers a huge collec-
tion of testimonies that is still useful for modern students 
to consult.21 
In book 1, Cressolles discusses the notion σοφιστής in 
ancient Greece and Rome and presents a brief history of 
the first and second sophistic following Philostratus’ divi-
sion at the beginning of his work. In book 2 he focuses on 
what Philostratus had called ancient sophistic, i.e. the 
sophists of the sixth and fifth century BCE. Cressolles 
begins with the division of the ancient sophists proposed 
by Adrien Tournebous (or Turnèbe, after the Latinized 
form Turnebus, 1512-1565) in his Adversaria. It consists 
of two groups, the sophists who are like orators, for ex-
ample Gorgias, and those who are like the dialecticians 
who were called ‘Eristici’ because they used the conten-
tious arguments (ἐριστικοί λόγοι) discussed by Aristotle 
in his Sophistical Refutations.22 It is the activity of this 
latter group which, according to Tournebous, seems to 
have produced the art of dialectic (Cressolles, book 2, 
chap. 1, pp. 104-110).23 Cressolles continues by explain-
ing that the vast majority of the ancient sophists, begin-
ning with Gorgias, professed to be not only orators but 
also philosophers, and were experts in what Cressolles 
calls the great arts, the magnae artes, including civil sci-
ence (Book 2, chap. 1, p. 105). In chapter 2 (pp. 111-115), 
Cressolles uses Gellius’ portrayal of Protagoras as an un-
truthful philosopher (Noctes Atticae 5.3.7 ‘Protagoras in-
sincerus philosophus’) as the start of a thirty-six pages 
long diatribe against the early sophists and their relativ-
ism and fallacies.24 According to Cressolles, these soph-
ists were corrupted philosophers, for two reasons. First, 
they used their knowledge to satisfy their greed and other 
shameful desires,25 and second, they aimed at probability 
instead of truth. Cressolles develops this second point in 
great detail, starting as follows:  
 
Altera causa fuit, quod in scholis explicandis, & disputationibus 
eruditis, probabilitatem sequerentur, atque omnia sic oratione 
colorarent, vt quae falsa essent, illa homines non nimis docti nec 
arguti, & credibilia, & verissima putarent: ex quo necesse fuit 
prauitatem opinionum, & foedos errores turbulentosque gener-
ari. Hinc δοξόσοφοι olim nominati, de quibus Clemens Alexan-
drinus ita scribit: οἳ µὲν οὖν, δοξόσοφοι καλούµενοι, οἱ τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν εὑρηκέναι νοµίζοντες, &c. (Book 2, chapter 2, p. 112)  
 
The other reason was that in their courses and disputations, they 
sought to attain probability, and in their speech they presented 
everything with a bias, so that not so very learned and clever 
people saw as credible and even as simply true what in fact was 
wrong; from this arose necessarily misguided opinions and 
abominable errors; for this reason these sophists were called in 
antiquity ‘δοξόσοφοι’ (‘wise in their own conceit’), about whom 
Clement of Alexandria wrote: “Those, then, who are called wise 
in their own opinions, who think that they have found the truth, 
etc.” (my trans.)  
 
This passage reflects Plato’s and Aristotle’s defamation of 
the sophists as men who have only apparent knowledge,26 
but Cressolles’ immediate point of reference are the 
Church Fathers who used similar language in their dis-
putes with dissenters. Cressolles’ use of the notion 
δοξόσοφοι (‘pretenders to wisdom’) is particularly reveal-
ing in this respect. Both Plato and Aristotle use it refer-
ring to sophists,27 but Cressolles quotes it from a passage 
in the seventh book of Clement of Alexandria’s Stromata, 
in which Clement replies to the objections asserted 
against the Christians by Greeks and Jews. He argues that 
many sects have emerged among Jews and Greek phi-
losophers, which hold views that are opposed to the 
Christian truth. Among the people who hold such views, 
many deceive themselves in thinking that they have found 
the truth, and are therefore called δοξόσοφοι (‘wise in 
their own opinions’).28 Clement continues by making the 
point that, while those who are δοξόσοφοι only deceive 
themselves because they avoid testing their views for fear 
of rebuttal and refuse instruction for fear of censure, oth-
ers malevolently deceive those who come to them and 
willingly darken the truth with arguments calculated to 
persuade.29 Cressolles elaborates this point by means of a 
set of testimonies from pagan authors and church fathers, 
and concludes that the philosophy of the early Greek 
sophists was impure and phoney.30 Cressolles clearly mis-
represents the historical facts because he randomly com-
bines negative judgements of the early Greek sophists by 
philosophers and rhetoricians with criticisms directed 
against non-Christians by church fathers, and pretends 
that the early Greek sophists were accused of preferring 
their own opinions above the established truth. 
This distortion of historical facts is brought home in 
chapter 3 on the ancient sophists’ method of philosophiz-
ing (‘sophistarum propria philosophandi ratio’, p. 116). In 
this chapter, Cressolles again presents a combined list of 
testimonies of pagan authors and church fathers that stig-
matize sophists and dialecticians as debaters who wanted 
to show off their brilliance rather than search for the truth. 
He then says in the same breath that this attitude is typical 
of all heretics: 
 
Hoc proprium est haereticorum ingenium, haec ingenita malitia, 
in impiis opinionibus tuendis hoc ἐριστικῷ genere impotenti 
animi impetu gloriari, & omisso rationis lumine, apud indoctam 
multitudinem inutili σκιαµαχίᾳ dicta impia ventilare; hinc fraus 
et pertinacia, et in susceptis erroribus animi elati et superbi ob-
stinatio. (Book 2, chapter 3, p. 120) 
 
This is typically the mindset of heretics, this is their inborn mal-
ice, to pride themselves with uncontrollable desire on this kind 
of contentious debate when they defend their impious opinions, 
and, having renounced the light of reason, to bring up for dis-
cussion among the unlearned public impious views in a useless 
fight against a shadow. This is the source of error and stubborn-
ness, and the obstinacy of a haughty mind that has accepted 
false doctrines. (my trans.) 
 
Cressolles concludes this chapter with the observation 
that it was the sophists’ unscrupulous practise of reason-
ing which caused their ill repute throughout antiquity.31 
Cressolles’ discussion of early Greek sophistic in 
chapters 2 and 3 of book 2 clearly stands in the tradition 
of the Platonic debate and is therefore quite negative. 
However, his survey also highlights that the Platonic tra-
dition was very strong among early Christian intellec-
tuals. His testimonies illustrate that church fathers com-
monly used the term sophist to stigmatize their non-
Christian opponents as dishonest intellectuals who op-
posed the Christian doctrine and deliberately preferred 
probability above the truth.32 In fact, one might say that 
Cressolles uses the ancient testimonies to almost redefine 
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the notion ‘sophist’ as a term to stigmatize people con-
sidered to be opponents of the Roman Church.  
In the course of chapters 2 and 3 Cressolles occasion-
ally also refers to authors from the medieval period, when 
the possible conflict between faith (fides) and reason 
(ratio) as sources of justification of belief was a much de-
bated issue. Thus, he quotes in chapter 2 a sentence from 
a tenth-century commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, 
attributed to Oecumenius, in which it is said that sophists 
are called impostors because they obscure the truth with 
deceit and fallacies (p.114), and in chapter 3 he cites Peter 
Damian who categorically rejects rhetoricians with their 
stylistic embellishments and enthymemes, and dialecti-
cians with their syllogisms and sophistries (p.117).33 
Cressolles does not specifically mention any later testi-
monies that stem from the debate of faith versus reason 
nor does he refer to the early sixteenth-century university 
theologians who condemned humanist theologians. How-
ever, his framing of intellectuals judged rightly or 
wrongly to be opponents of the official church doctrine 
appears to be similar to the way early Christian, Medieval 
and Renaissance champions of Church orthodoxy ap-
proached their opponents. In each case, an opponent is 
denied the right to debate by claiming that the subject 
presented for discussion cannot be discussed by means of 
dialectical reasoning, because it represents a truth which 
may not be called into question. The sole motive for such 
an attack on dialectical reasoning was to prevent discus-
sions that were judged by conservative theologians to be 
detrimental to the Church. 
For Agricola, however, dialectic is not questionable 
because he assumes that its users properly apply it to sub-
jects about which arguments for and against can legiti-
mately be defended, even if they concern subject matter 
pertaining to the Christian faith. As a typical humanist, 
Agricola accepts that belief in God and religious truth, as 
revealed in the Bible or established by either church 
dogma or binding council pronouncements, were the 
cornerstone of human existence.34 This fundament of hu-
man existence cannot be a subject for debate, while 
everything else belongs to the realm of uncertainty and is 
therefore by definition disputable. Hence, assuming that a 
debater has good faith, reasoning for and against cannot 
by itself imply a fundamental denial of the Christian truth, 
and dialectic cannot be discredited categorically as a 
source of corruption. Accordingly, when Agricola ex-
plains that dialectic is an ars, he is remarkably mild about 
sophistical reasoning and he does not emphatically impute 
it to dishonesty of its users: 
 
Fallit tamen nonnunquam dialecticus, et pro veris falsa tradit. 
Evenit id quidem, sed et navem gubernator evertit, et medicus 
aliquando perimit. Hominum sunt ista, non artium. Atque vel eo 
magis fatendum erit, utilem esse dialecticen, cum et qui oratione 
seducunt, astu id persaepe, nulla etiam instructi arte faciant, et 
qui fallitur, si artem calleret, vel nequaquam id vel minus utique 
pateretur. Sane sicut reliquae artes, quae remedio sunt inventae 
humanis necessitatibus, non potuerunt succurrere incommodis, 
nisi prius ea detegerent, sic dialectice, cum magna ex parte in eo 
sit posita, quo pacto laqueos captionum fraudumque in dicendo 
vitemus, necesse habuit aperire insidias et ostendere quam varie 
quis capi posset. Quae si quis inde deprompta utenda sibi puta-
vit, non artis haec est culpa, vitare fugienda monstrantis, sed 
improbitatis, sectari vitanda cupientis. Aperienda enim sunt, ut 
caveantur, mala et nemo artifex tantum remedia novit. Relictum 
ergo nobis sit, artem esse dialecticen. (De inventione dialectica 
2.2, ed. Mundt, 208) 
 
But the dialectician sometimes misguides and teaches false 
things instead of true ones. This happens indeed, but sometimes 
a steersman sinks a ship and a doctor causes a patient to die; that 
is the fault of human beings, not of their arts. Besides, one must 
admit all the more that dialectic is useful, since those who mis-
lead by means of speech very often do so without any instruc-
tion, and the person who is being misled would either not at all 
or at least less likely allow this to happen, if he were to know the 
art. Indeed, as the other arts that are invented to a remedy 
against the needs of mankind cannot relieve misfortunes if they 
do not first uncover these, so dialectic, which is for the most part 
concerned with means to avoid the traps of sophisms and deceit 
in reasoning, must necessarily explain first the treacheries and 
show in how many different ways one can be deceived. If some-
one thinks he has to use the insights gained from these rules, this 
is not the fault of the art that shows to avoid things that must be 
shun from, but the responsibility of the wicked person who 
wishes to chase what he must avoid. For bad things must be dis-
closed so that one may guard against them, and no craftsman 
knows only the remedies. Our conclusion therefore is that dia-
lectic is an art. (my trans.) 
 
Agricola presents his theory of the topics as a reform of 
its medieval counterpart and his discussion of it is em-
bedded in the medieval tradition of philosophical debate 
in the universities. But, similarly to the ancient Greek 
sophists, he is not only a dialectician who focuses on 
philosophical debate, but also a rhetorician who teaches 
how to use the art of reasoning in the public sphere. He 
knows the power of language,35 and explains that, in order 
to convince an audience, it is not enough to instruct (do-
cere), but also to inspire (movere). Thus, when he intro-
duces topical invention and its uses, he explicitly men-
tions deliberative oratory and the art of preaching, and in 
his discussion of the shortcomings of medieval dialectic, 
he points out that university theologians study physics, 
metaphysics and dialectic, but prove inadequate in teach-
ing common people and stimulating them to the obser-
vance of the Christian virtues.36  Early sixteenth-century 
humanists, such as Cornelius Agrippa and Erasmus in 
their declamations, adopted a similar view and promoted 
the use of rational argumentation and emotional persua-
sion to stimulate Christians to live in accordance with the 
moral standards of the Gospel. In the circumstances of 
their time, however, such liberty could not exist, and their 
opponents silenced them using the same technique of 
framing which had been used to discredit the ancient 





In summary, the texts and testimonies discussed in this 
essay have shown that the fifteenth-century humanist 
Rudolph Agricola appears to have had a more positive 
view of the early Greek sophists and their art of dialectic 
and oratory than the Jesuit Louis de Cressolles, who was a 
champion of post-Tridentine Catholic orthodoxy. Fur-
thermore, the texts reviewed suggest that there was a 
strong tradition, going back to the times of the Church 
Fathers, of using the term ‘sophista’ in debates between 
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theologians as a nickname to frame opponents of official 
church doctrine as dishonest and misguided intellectuals. 
In the Renaissance, this practice was continued by a typi-
cally conservative theologian of the Roman church such 
as the Jesuit Cressolles in his history of the ancient soph-
ists. In his discussion of the early Greek sophists, Cres-
solles followed Turnebus’ division of the sophists in those 
who practised oratory on the one hand and those who 
practised eristic and invented dialectic on the other. This 
division implies a negative judgement about the early 
Greek sophists and dialectic in general, which stands in 
stark contrast with Agricola’s positive view of both dia-
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